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Abstract
In this paper we document a strong positive correlation of immigration ﬂows with changes
in average wages and average house rents for native residents across U.S. states. Instrumental
variables estimates reveal that the correlations are compatible with a causal interpretation from
immigration to wages and rents of natives. Separating the eﬀects of immigrants on natives
of diﬀerent schooling levels we ﬁnd positive eﬀects on the wages and rents of highly educated
and small eﬀects on the wages (negative) and rents (positive) of less educated. We propose a
model where natives and immigrants of three diﬀerent education levels interact in production
in a central district and live in the surrounding region. In equilibrium the inﬂow of immigrants
has a positive productive eﬀect on natives due to complementarieties in production as well as a
positive competition eﬀect on rents. The model calibrated and simulated with U.S.-states data
matches most of the estimated eﬀects of immigrants on wages and rents of natives in the period
1990-2005. This validation suggests the proposed model as a useful tool to evaluate the impacts
of alternative immigration scenarios on U.S. wages and rents.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The literature on the economic impact of immigrants on U.S. natives has been, so far, overwhelmingly
dominated by a labor market perspective and a ”partial equilibrium” approach. Others things equal,
economists have argued, an increase in the supply of foreign-born workers in a certain skill group
depresses the wages of native workers of like skill (Borjas, 2003, Borjas, 2006, Borjas and Katz, 2005).
Because of complementarities, however, immigration also increases the wage of U.S.-born workers with
diﬀerent skills. Recent empirical evidence has suggested that rents for U.S.-born individuals have
risen signiﬁcantly more in those metropolitan areas that received a larger inﬂow of immigrants (Saiz,
2003, 2006), though studies that focussed on the group of less educated, low income natives who are
more likely to compete with less educated immigrants for housing, have not found a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
immigration on the rents of those individuals (Greulich, Quigley and Raphael, 2004). We have argued
elsewhere (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005a, 2006b) thatc o n s i d e r i n gl a b o rm a r k e ti n t e r a c t i o n sb e t w e e n
workers of diﬀerent education and experience levels, and accounting for imperfect substitutability
between foreign-born and U.S.-born workers, the average eﬀect of immigrants on wages of U.S.-
born workers is positive; more educated workers receive the largest part of that positive average
eﬀect and the group of workers with no high school diploma suﬀers a small wage decline. The
impact of immigration on wages and rents (house prices) are by far the two most important market
channels through which immigration aﬀects the real income of U.S. residents.1 While Cortes (2006)
showed signiﬁcant eﬀects of immigration on the price of non-tradeable services (such as housekeeping,
baby-sitting and gardening) across U.S. cities, the share of expenditures in those services is too
low for those eﬀects to have signiﬁcant welfare implications. For the average American, personal
and housekeeping services constituted 2% of total expenditures, while housing expenses (shelter)
constituted 20% to 30% according to the 2005 Consumer Expenditure Survey (published by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics). To have a reasonable assessment of the impact of immigration on the real
income of U.S.-born individuals, therefore, one should begin considering the impact of immigration on
wages and rents jointly. Moreover, to address the relevant issues of distributional eﬀects in addition
1Another relevant channel through which immigrants may aﬀect natives’ income is through ﬁscal eﬀects in the form
of higher or lower tax burdens for natives. Depending on whether immigrants use welfare more or less than natives
and pay lower or higher taxes than natives, immigration may imply a redistribution in the recipient country, though
these eﬀects are often hard to measure and identify.
2to average eﬀects, one needs to consider native and immigrant workers with diﬀerent levels of skills, as
those imply diﬀerent income levels and housing choices and, more importantly, because immigrants
are unevenly distributed across schooling groups. This paper oﬀers a novel approach to analyzing
and measuring the eﬀects of immigration. It considers the eﬀect on the joint labor and housing
market equilibrium in a setting with skill-diﬀerentiated workers, thereby isolating skill-speciﬁca n d
location-speciﬁco u t c o m e s . 2
The paper ﬁrst analyzes some empirical features of the relation between immigration and wages/rents
across U.S. states and their metropolitan residents, using census data from 1970-2000 and the Amer-
ican Community Survey data for 2005. We ﬁnd that there was a positive, stable and very signiﬁcant
relation between the inﬂow of foreign-born and the change in average wage and average house prices
(rents) for natives across U.S. states. These two positive average eﬀects are robust to variable def-
initions, to the chosen sample and to the method of estimation used. In particular, we construct
a supply-driven shift of immigrants across U.S. states based on the tendency of new immigrants to
settle where previous immigrants from their country already live (for personal preferences, informa-
tion and insurance reasons). Using this instrument for immigrant supply we show that the positive
and signiﬁcant correlation is not only driven by demand (pull) factors and survives the instrumental
variables estimation. An inﬂow of immigrants is associated in the long run with higher average wages
and average rents of natives and with a small migration of natives out of the state. Moreover, mea-
suring the eﬀect on workers/dwellers with high education (college), medium education (high school)
or low education (no degree) we ﬁnd that immigration had the largest positive wage eﬀect on highly
educated, while it had a small negative eﬀect on the wages of less educated. At the same time, the
rents (house prices) of the highly educated were highly sensitive to immigration while the rents of
the least educated were relatively insensitive to immigration.
To explain these facts we model the behavior of U.S. natives as workers in an open local economy
(city or state) with a central business district (CBD) where production takes place, and a linear
residential district where people live that is symmetrically distributed around its center.3 Individuals
2In previous work (Ottaviano and Peri 2005b and 2006a) we considered the joint eﬀect of immigrants on average
wages and average rents across U.S. cities. However, distinct from this paper, we adopted a representative agent
approach, did not model the source of productivity eﬀects, and did not analyze the residential choice and equilibrium.
3Here the assumption of a linear local economy organized around a CBD is made for simplicity. As we will see,
it is enough for our purposes being able to generate a model of residential location that reasonably ﬁts the observed
response of U.S. wages and rents to immigration. Brueckner et al (1999) show that accounting for the heterogeneity of
3are producers and consumers of a tradable good and of a local service, as well as consumers of housing
services. U.S.-born individuals can move out of the region if immigrants decrease their real income
or into the region if immigrants increase it. This model allows us to analyze the consequences of
migration on wages, rents and employment of natives in each group in general equilibrium. Impor-
tantly, we consider heterogeneous native and foreign-born individuals in three groups, according to
their schooling level. This allows us to capture the average as well as the relative changes in wages,
rents and real income for natives of low, intermediate or high levels of schooling, accounting for their
complementarity in production and for the fact that they stratify in diﬀerent housing locations. The
model considers the representative metropolitan population of a state in the U.S. and simulates the
eﬀect of the 1990-2005 migration ﬂow on wages, prices, house values and real income of U.S. natives.
Calibrating parameter values with estimates from the literature, the model matches the response
of average wages, house prices and the migration of natives to the inﬂow of international migrants
remarkably well. We also derive empirical predictions from the model for the impact of immigration
on each education group’s wage, housing price and housing income. Again the simulated results
match remarkably well with the estimated elasticities, except for the eﬀe c t so fi m m i g r a t i o no nt h e
wages/rents of less educated individuals as those elasticities are larger in the simulated model than
in the data.
This validation suggests the proposed model as a useful tool for policy analysis aimed at the
evaluation of the impacts of alternative immigration scenarios on U.S. wages and rents. We analyse
several types of scenarios. In the ﬁrst, we use our calibrated model to assess the eﬀects of immigration
on the average U.S. state without the undocumented migrants. In this scenario we use the estimates
by Passel (2005) and attribute all undocumented to the group of least educated immigrants. The
low skill inﬂow would be reduced to roughly one third of the actual one without signiﬁcantly altering
the inﬂows of medium and high skill migrants. In the second type of scenarios, we ask what would
have happened to the average U.S. state if this had alternatively experienced the same immigration
patterns as some states at the center of the immigration debate (namely, California, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York and Texas). Overall, the simulated scenarios stress the crucial role played
the spatial distribution of amenities within cities allows one to replicate the multiplicity of location patterns observed
in reality without signiﬁcantly aﬀecting the properties of the simple monocentric model that are relevant for the present
analysis.
4by the matching between native and immigrant skills in terms of both the average eﬀect and their
distribution across skill groups. They also reveal the importance of a general equilibrium approach
to evaluating the eﬀects of immigration as the associated shocks are absorbed not only in the wages
of the natives but also in their rents and employment levels.
To summarize, three main results are obtained from the model and match the empirical ﬁndings.
First, due to complementarities between natives and immigrants in the production of the tradeable
and of the non-tradable goods, the overall production eﬀects of immigrants on natives is positive,
on average. Second, immigration, particualrly of more educated people, increases the competition
for housing and the complementarities in production attract native workers and both facts increase
housing prices and rents. Such an increase is larger for the houses of medium and highly educated
who live in the most desirable locations. Finally, even at the lowest skill level, natives have higher
ownership rates of houses than foreign-born. Consequently, each group of natives receives a positive
housing income eﬀect from immigrants so that house owners in each group of education have a
positive transfer from immigrants. Workers can arbitrage away the real eﬀects on wages by moving
across states and therefore the only net eﬀects on the real income of natives are the housing income
eﬀects. The individuals who lose more from immigration are less educated native workers who rent
their house. Some of them move out because their wage does not increase by much (or decreases by
a little) and their rent increases, substantially aﬀecting their real income. On the other hand for less
educated workers who own their houses, the positive housing income eﬀect is larger than the small
negative real wage eﬀect. We also ﬁnd that in the model, as in the data, the migratory response of
native workers to immigration is quite moderate.
T h er e s to ft h ep a p e ri so r g a n i z e da sf o l l o w s :S e c t ion 2 reviews the previous literature on the re-
gional eﬀects of immigration on wages and housing prices. Section 3 presents new empirical estimates
of the eﬀects of immigration on wages, house prices and internal migration of natives, considering
average eﬀects as well as eﬀects by education group. Section 4 presents the model that describes
the eﬀect of immigrants on wages, housing prices and the location choice of natives. Section 5 cali-
brates and simulates the equilibrium of the model: in particular, we validate the responses of wages,
house prices and the location of natives to the immigration ﬂows of a typical U.S. state during the
1990-2005 period, on average as well as for each skill group. The resulting match with the estimated
5elasticity is reasonably good: the elasticities of average wage, rents and employment are exactly in
the estimated range and four out of six elasticities across education groups also match the estimated
ranges. This validation allows us to use the proposed model as a useful tool to evaluate the impacts
of alternativeand couterfactual immigration scenarios. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
Our paper provides a coherent approach to analyzing the most important market-eﬀects of immigra-
tion on U.S. natives: labor markets and housing markets eﬀects. Hence, our work also brings together
two diﬀerent strands of the literature. On one hand, a long empirical tradition (Card, 1990, 2001,
2007) has looked at state or metropolitan area wages to see whether they were systematically aﬀected
by immigration, and has found little evidence of that. Even when considering the migratory response
of natives (Card and Di Nardo, 2000) such a “regional” approach did not detect relevant eﬀects of
immigrants on native wages. Recent articles (such as Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997, Borjas 2003)
have raised some doubts on such an approach arguing that the migratory response of natives and
small sample bias may reduce the estimates of the eﬀects of migrants on wages (Borjas, 2006). On the
other hand, Albert Saiz (Saiz, 2003, 2006) and our previous work (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005a) have
shown that the price of housing in metropolitan are a sa c r o s st h eU . S .a r es y s tematically positively
correlated with immigration ﬂows. Immigrants are concentrated in few states and live primarily in
metropolitan areas. As the eﬀect of the migrant inﬂow is not fully oﬀset by out-migration of natives,
migrants increase the demand and price of housing. In theory, in the long run, this eﬀect should
simply lead to more housing construction, though in practice land regulation and scarcity of desirable
locations generate an increase in the value of land and houses in most typical immigrant destinations
(this mechanism is illustrated in Gyourko et al., 2005). A study by Greulich, Quigley and Raphael
( 2 0 0 4 )t h a tf o c u s e so nt h ee ﬀect of immigration on the rents of the speciﬁc set of U.S.-born who are
more likely to compete for rents with immigrants (mostly in the lower income range), does not ﬁnd
much of an eﬀect of immigration on this group, suggesting that the migration and housing supply
response could indeed oﬀset the inﬂow of immigrants.
The wage and housing price channels are both very important to understand the eﬀects of immi-
6gration on the welfare of native individuals and it is clear that they need to be analyzed together.
As Robak (1982) showed, to analyze a spatial equilibrium in which individuals equate consumption
wages across locations we need to consider both wages and local prices. The response of natives to
immigration in a U.S. state (or city) depends on how wages change relative to local prices, and the
price of housing is the most relevant in determining local prices as spending for housing represents
between 20 and 30% of total current expenditures for Americans. Hence, wages, housing prices and
the location response of natives need to be analyzed within the same equilibrium model. Moreover,
increasing wage dispersion over recent decades (Autor, Katz and Kearny, 2005) has been accompa-
nied by increasing housing price dispersion across states and metropolitan areas (Gyourko, Meyer
and Sinai, 2005). This suggests that an important adjustment mechanism for a local economy may
involve house prices increasing or decreasing with wages in response to immigration, keeping ”con-
sumption” wages more stable across locations with little response of inter-city migration. Finally, we
incorporate a second ”price eﬀect” of immigration in our theoretical model. This could be called a
”consumption variety” eﬀect. In local non-tradable services such as restaurants and entertainment
(accounting for a 15% and 20% share of average U.S. individual expenditure in 2005) the presence
of foreign-born workers and the diﬀerentiated varieties of services that they provide add to the di-
versity of consumption and have a positive economic value. The beneﬁts from increased variety in
consumption (so celebrated in the trade and growth literature) are often mentioned by the migration
literature but never modeled and measured seriously, in contrast to the price eﬀects of increased
consumption varieties in traded goods (e.g. Feenstra, 1994, Broda and Weinstein, 2006). Our work
provides a framework and a ﬁrst step to quantify those variety eﬀects in the context of local services
provided by immigrants.
3 The Empirical Evidence
3.1 Aggregate Wages and Aggregate House Prices
The point of departure of our analysis is some striking empirical measures of the aggregate impact of
immigration on average wages and rents (house prices) of natives. Previous literature has focussed
o nt h ei s s u eo frelative wages of natives, considering immigration as a shift in the relative supply of
7less skilled workers (Borjas 2003, Card, 2001, 2007) while some articles have discredited the regional
approach somewhat, claiming that labor mobility of natives would drastically attenuate any eﬀect
on wages (Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997, Borjas 2006). Despite these critiques of the ”area
approach,” we begin by considering the average wages of natives, the average house rents (prices) of
natives and their association with immigration at the state level. There are three reasons why these
correlations are particularly interesting and contain a lot of information on the ”production” and
”consumption” value of immigration for natives. First, diﬀerences in productivity and wages across
states produced by diﬀerences in immigration rates need not be eliminated by internal migration
of natives if they also cause corresponding changes in the value and price of housing. That is,
the positive (negative) productivity eﬀects may be oﬀset by more (less) expensive housing, barely
aﬀecting real wages. Second, in Ottaviano and Peri (2006b) we showed that there is a mechanism,
represented by complementarities in production, through which immigrants may raise the average
wage of natives even when immigrants of each particular skill type still have a negative partial eﬀect,
ceteris paribus, on the wages of natives. If overall immigrants are imperfect substitutes for natives,
t h ep o s i t i v ew a g ee ﬀects across skill groups are larger than the negative wage eﬀects within skill group
producing a positive average eﬀect. Such positive ”complementarity” eﬀects would be captured best
by aggregate empirical evidence at the state level and could be lost in an approach that only focuses
on eﬀects ”by skill”. Finally, in previous work (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005a, 2006a) we document the
positive correlation between native wages/house prices and immigration across U.S. metropolitan
areas; similarly, Saiz (2006) documents such a correlation for house prices across U.S. cities. Here
we want to show that the positive correlation is found across states, across their metropolitan areas,
and that this correlation is robust across speciﬁcations and over time. Moreover, by constructing a
supply-driven shift of immigration across U.S. states we want to show that such positive correlations
are compatible with genuine ”eﬀects” of immigration and not the spurious result of unobservable
state-speciﬁcd e m a n ds h o c k s .
3.1.1 OLS Correlations
The data used for the empirical analysis are constructed using individual records from the Integrated
Public Use Microdata Samples of the U.S. Census collected and homogenized by Ruggles et al. (2006).
8We use the 1% Form 1 state sample for 1970, the 5% state sample for 1980, 5% state sample for 1990,
5% census sample for 2000 and the 1 in 100 random sample for the American Community Survey for
2005. The units of observation are alternatively all residents of 50 U.S. states plus DC, or residents
in metropolitan areas within the U.S. states. For all employment and wage data we select people in
the 17 to 65 age range who worked at least one week and received positive salary. For population
data we selected all individuals residing in a state in the 17 to 65 age range. For all housing data,
rent, housing value and house characteristics we selected records relative to individuals who are
head of households. The aggregate data on employment and population by state are constructed
by weighting each individual by the sample weight (variable PERWT). The average data on wages,
rents and value of houses are constructed averaging across individuals using their personal weight as
well. All current dollar values are converted to constant 2000 dollar values using the consumption
price index (CPI-U) deﬂator (available at the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/). In our empirical analysis we consider as foreign-born those individuals
who are not born in the U.S. or its territories overseas and who were not citizens at birth. First we
show the correlation between immigration and increase in the average wages of U.S.-born workers at
the state level in Table 1, as well as in Figure 1. The coeﬃcients in Table 1 represent the estimates

















jt is the average wage of U.S.-born (Home) workers in state j and Census year t, ∆wH
jt is
its change over the period between Census t and the following one, αt are period ﬁxed eﬀects, Fjt
is the total employment of foreign-born in state j and year t and ∆Fjt is the net change between
Census t and the following one; similarly Hjt is total employment of U.S. natives in state j and
∆Hjt i si t si n t e r - C e n s u sc h a n g e . F i n a l l yεjt is a random zero-mean state-period shock. An OLS
estimate of (1) can be no more than a correlation as we are regressing wages on employment and
potentially mixing demand and supply shifts. One important thing, however, is that we are already
controlling for the change in employment of native workers. Demand shocks that generically attract
workers to the state would be captured by the coeﬃcient β0 (not reported in the table and usually
9close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant ) while γwagecaptures only the co-movement of native
wages with movements in immigrant employment, orthogonal to native employment γwage.G i v e n
that both changes are measured in percentage terms γwage can be interpreted as an elasticity: when
immigration increases state employment by one percent the wage of natives in that state would
increase by γwage percent. Whether measuring wage in yearly or weekly terms and whether using all
workers or male only to calculate average wages, the ﬁrst row of Table 1 always shows very signiﬁcant










after controlling for change in native employment, and shows a clear positive
correlation with no evidence of nonlinearity or outliers driving the result. Row 4 of Table 1 shows the
elasticity estimates when we consider only workers in the metropolitan areas of each state (identiﬁed
by the METRO variable in the IPUMS) and the immigration into the corresponding metropolitan
areas. In that speciﬁcation, one unit of observation is the aggregate of all metropolitan residents
within each of the 50 US states plus DC. The complementarity eﬀects and the housing price eﬀects
could be stronger in metropolitan areas since productive interactions are intense and land is scarce
there. The coeﬃcient estimated on metropolitan workers only is signiﬁcant and close to (possibly
slightly higher than) the one estimated using all workers. We performed a number of other checks
(not reported and available upon request) using sub-samples of states (e.g. excluding California,
or the top 3 receivers of immigration) and sub-periods (1980-2000 only) conﬁrming the remarkable
robustness of this estimate.
Table 2 and Figure 2 report a similar analysis for the eﬀect of immigration on the price of houses
of native individuals. The ﬁrst row of Table 2 shows the partial correlation between immigration


















jt is the average rent (or house price) of U.S.-born individuals in state j and Census year t
and ∆rus
jt is its change over the period following Census t. The other variables are as deﬁned above,
except that now we measure Fjt and Hjt as foreign- and U.S.-born population of working age residing
10in state j in year t, rather than employment. We still control for native’s population change so that
the correlation γhouse price indicates the association of house prices of natives to immigration changes
orthogonal to changes in native population. Row 1 of Table 2 shows an elasticity of rents to immigra-
tion between 0.60 and 0.82 and very signiﬁcant. Figure 2 illustrates the partial correlation estimated
in column 2 row 1 and conﬁrms that there is a discernible positive association, not apparently driven
by outliers or odd nonlinearity. Row 4 of Table 2, restricted to the metropolitan areas of each state,
shows similar elasticity estimates for rents, however the estimated elasticitiesof house prices are often
more volatile and imprecisely estimated, still always positive and often around one. For rents and
house prices we notice that the estimated elasticities are larger and more signiﬁcant when we use
the data relative to metropolitan areas only. This is reasonable and consistent with the idea that
immigration has a particularly strong eﬀect on city rents because of the presence of land regulation
and limited availability of desirable locations. Including data from the whole state dilutes this eﬀect.
We also perform estimation using mediansand averages as we are concerned that the strict top-coding
of the census for monthly rents and value of housing may eliminate a large upper tail of the price
distribution and bias the average estimates. There seems to be no systematic diﬀerence, however,
between the estimates using the median and those using the average rent and house price.
3.1.2 Supply Shocks and Instrumental Variables Estimates
The possibility that unobservable demand/productivity shocks in states may be correlated with im-
migration of foreign-born (and certainly with native immigration) induce possible correlation between
the variable
∆Fjt
Fjt+Hjt and the residuals of equations (1) and (2) so that the elasticities γ cannot be
interpreted as the eﬀect of an exogenous change (supply shift) in immigration on wages and house
prices. In order to identify the γ’sas measuring the impact of immigration on native wages and rents,
we need to identify shifts in immigration across states and periods due to supply (push) factors rather
than demand (pull) factors. This is done in the literature (originally the idea is from Card, 2001,
subsequently used in Lewis, 2005, Ottaviano and Peri, 2005a, 2006a and Saiz, 2006, among others)
by using the facts that immigrants tend to settle disproportionately where other people of the same
nationality already reside and that diﬀerent nationalities had very diﬀerent immigration rates to
the U.S. during the 1970-2005 period. Technically, we consider the composition of the foreign-born
11population by state and country of origin in 1970 and attribute to each group the net immigration
rate (by nationality and period) for the whole U.S. over each inter-Census period. This allows us to
construct an ”imputed” population for foreign-born by country of origin and state in each subsequent
census year (1980, 1990, 2000 and 2005). Aggregating across nationalities in each state for each of
the census years following 1970 we obtain an imputed foreign-born population that we use as an
instrument for the actual foreign-born population. Let us call Fcjt the population of foreign-born
from country c in state j and year t. The total population of foreign-born from country c in the
whole U.S. in year t will be denoted simply as Fct =
P
j Fcjt. Its change between Census year t and
Census year t+n will be denoted as ∆Fct,t+n and the growth rate of that group at the national level,
between t and t + n will be denoted as gct,t+n = ∆Fct,t+n/Fct. We identify 56 foreign countries of
origin covering more than 99% of all U.S. immigrants during the 1970-2005 period.4 The imputed





Fcj1970(1 + gc1970,1970+n)( 3 )
We then use the change in foreign-born calculated using the imputed data as an instrument for
the actual change. Namely, the variable
∆e Fjt+n
e Ftt+n+Hjt+n is used as an instrument for
∆Fjt+n
Ftt+n+Hjt+n.Rows 2
of Tables 1 and 2 show the instrumental variable estimates of the coeﬃcients γwage and γhouse price,
and rows 3 show the ﬁrst stage coeﬃcient and F-test for the instrument. Similarly Rows 5 and
6 show IV estimates and ﬁrst stage coeﬃcients for the metropolitan samples across states. All
IV regressions include period dummies, and exclude the potentially endogenous change in native
employment (population). The instrument should isolate the supply-driven changes in immigration
only. The imputed change of foreign-born turns out to be a good instrument at the state level with
a partial R2 of around 0.4 and and F larger than 20. The point estimates for γwage using the IV
technique range between 0.34 and 0.56, depending on the sample and wage deﬁnition, and are always
signiﬁcantly positive. The IV estimates for γhouse price obtained using rent data range between 0.64
and 0.81. When we use data on house prices, the elasticity are less precisely estimated, always positive
4The census data include undocumented immigrants residing on the national territory. While there may be some
undercounting of undocumented immigrants due to diﬃculties in locating those people recent studies estimate that
such undercounting was small (less than 10% of all undocumented might have been missed).
12a n di ns o m ec a s e sa sl a r g ea s2 .4. This may be due to the larger volatility of prices which also depend
on the expectation of future appreciation, while rents, the cost of use, should be related more closely
to fundamentals. All in all, the IV estimates conﬁrm and reinforce the OLS estimates. Immigration
produces a positive eﬀect on the wages of native workers with elasticities in the 0.35−0.55 range and
a positive eﬀect on housing expenditure with elasticities roughly between 0.6−0.8w h e ne s t i m a t e do n
rents. One further test that the instruments seem to be working in the expected direction is shown
in Table 3. The table shows the elasticity of native population or native employment to changes in
immigrant population (or employment). Interestingly, while the OLS estimates (ﬁrst column) are
positive and signiﬁcant, proving that natives and immigrants’ populations both respond to common
(demand) shocks by moving together into and out of states, the response of natives to supply-driven
immigration shocks is negative, however quite small and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. We can
rule out that the IV estimates are equal to the OLS ones at the 1% conﬁdence level, implying that
unobservable demand shocks are driving, in part, both types of immigration to a given state. On
the other hand we can also rule out that one immigrant worker displaces one native worker in terms
of employment (by pushing the native out of the state) which would imply a coeﬃcient of -1 in
the IV regression. We cannot rule out that supply-driven immigration shocks have no eﬀects on
theemployment of natives, by simply increasing the total supply of workers in the state. Immigrants
only induce a mild out-migration response of natives, if at all, and certainly a much smaller response
than one-for-one . This fact, along with the positive eﬀect on average wage and house prices is one
of the robust regularities that our simple model should explain.
3.2 Wage and House Prices by Skill Group
The average eﬀect of immigration received little attention in the past as economists focussed on
its distributional (relative) eﬀects, increasingly so as immigration has become skewed towards less
skilled workers and as native unskilled workers have fared rather poorly (in terms of wages) in the
U.S. economy (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006b). Here we extend our empirical analysis to identify the
correlation between immigration and wages or rents of natives in diﬀerent schooling groups. Schooling
is a very important aspect of workers’ skill. On theone hand, workers of diﬀerent schooling levels
generally compete for diﬀerent jobs, so that the impact of immigrants with low education is more
13severe on wages of less educated natives, while highly educated natives mostly experience positive
complementarity eﬀects. On the other hand, diﬀerences in education are very closely correlated to
diﬀerences in income and in the housing markets in which individuals compete. The houses demanded
by less educated immigrants are in more direct competition with those demanded by less educated
natives. Hence in this section we analyze the eﬀe c t so fi m m i g r a n t so nt h ew a g e sa n dh o u s ep r i c e s
of the native population by education group. The most parsimonious and meaningful way of doing
this is to divide natives and immigrants into three education groups: those with low education (no
degree), those with intermediate education (high school degree) and those with higher education
(college degree). The presence and inﬂow of immigrants is proportionally larger in the low and high
education groups than in the medium education group. Figure 3 shows the percentage of foreign-
born workers in each of the three education groups for the U.S. and for states that receive large
percentages of immigrants. The prevailing pattern of immigration is a U-shape across the three skill
levels in aggregate as well as for the individual states. This implies that an appropriate model of
immigration should bifurcate education into at least three groups (low, medium and high). At the
same time, the location and type of house bought and rented by the group of individuals with a
low level of education within a state or a metropolitan area tend to be quite diﬀerent than those
purchased and rented by medium or highly educated people. Several recent papers (Gyourko et al.,
2005, Van Nieuwerburgh and Weil, 2006) have shown an increasing tendency to housing segregation
by skill/income and have explained the increased dispersion in house prices and rents via sorting of
individual and increasing wage (income) dispersion. As a consequence, the eﬀect of immigration on
house prices may be diﬀerent across levels of the skill distribution.
3.2.1 Rent Eﬀects in a Segmented Housing Market
We begin analyzing the impact of immigration on housing prices by education group. Table 4 reports
the coeﬃcients obtained by estimating rent regressions such as (2) separately for each education
group.5 All variables are deﬁned as above, including the instrument, though now we only consider
natives and immigrants in the speciﬁc education group when calculating the dependent and the
explanatory variable and when constructing the imputed immigration. Column 1 reports the results
5We also performed a SUR estimation and a pooled estimation across schooling groups allowing separate elasticity
by skills, which produced very similar results
14for the high school dropout group, Column 2 for the high school graduate group and Column 3
for the college graduate group. The instruments are constructed by using the initial (1970) foreign
population in a state by schooling and country of origin and equating its inter-Census growth to
the overall growth of that education-nationality group in the U.S. due to immigration. In this case,
our instrument captures the fact that a state starting out with many Mexicans would experience
large supply-driven growth of the low education group among foreign-born, as most recent Mexican
migration consisted of high school dropouts. On the other hand, a state hosting many Indians or
Chinese in 1970 would experience a supply-driven increase of highly educated foreign-born as those
countries experienced signiﬁcant recent migration of college educated. We report the estimates of
γhouse price using OLS (and controlling for native population changes) or IV methods using housing
price or rent per room as the dependent variable. The ﬁrst four rows of Table 3 refer to the whole
s t a t es a m p l ea n dt h el a s tf o u rt ot h es a m p l ei n c l u d ing only metropolitan areas. First, notice that
the instruments are better predictors of the change in low skill immigration than of the changes in
other education groups (due to stronger co-location and lower state-to-state mobility of less educated
immigrants). Second, for all estimates the impact of immigrants on prices/rents of housing for the
g r o u po fl e s se d u c a t e di ss m a l la n di n s i g n i ﬁcant, while the impact on prices of housing for medium
and highly educated natives is positive and signiﬁcant. The average elasticity of native high school
dropout rents to immigrants in the same schooling group is 0.2 while for the other two groups it is
in the 0.6-2.3 range. These results are consistent with previous ﬁndings of signiﬁcant average eﬀects
of immigration on rents of native residents (Saiz, 2003) but small eﬀects for the rents of the low
income group (less educated) who are likely to compete with less educated immigrants for housing
(Greulich et al 2003). Given the very large increase in less educated foreign-born who crowded the
market for this type of housing and given that the out-migration of natives in this group has been
very moderate and in line with average migration patterns (γpopulation for high school dropouts is
estimated to be around -0.20 with a standard error of 0.3 using the IV method) such a low price
response seems to suggest elastic house supply for this group. On the other hand, the eﬀect on
housing prices for more educated natives is quite large, implying that the supply of houses for those
people might be constrained by the availability of desirable metropolitan locations. As our elasticities
capture the long-run responses of prices, a plausible explanation could be that the land for better
15housing is a limited portion of cities, closer to the business districts and whose price is more sensitive
to density (Gyourko et al, 2005), while the low quality housing is on the ”marginal land” farther from
the business district and whose price is less elastic to distance and hence less sensitive to a further
expansion of the city to the outskirts.
3.2.2 Wage Eﬀects by Education
It is well known that immigration should reduce the wages of the group of workers with low education
in relative terms, given the large relative inﬂow of immigrants with like education. If there is imperfect
substitutability between natives and immigrants, however, because of diﬀerential occupational and
job choice, then the possibility of an overall positive eﬀect on natives may emerge. Still some groups
may be gaining more and othersmay suﬀer wage losses (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006b). Here we analyze
how the average positive eﬀect of immigrants (estimated in Table 1 and described above) is the
combination of diﬀerent eﬀects of immigrants on native wages in each education group. Let us
emphasize that we are estimating a reduced-form elasticity. The experiment does not consist of
changing the supply of immigrants of one skill group, keeping all others constant. That exercise
would identify a partial elasticity of wage and has been done in previous work (e.g. Borjas, 2006).
Here we identify the total eﬀect associated to a supply-driven change in immigration on wages of
workers by education group. As a state that receives many unskilled immigrants in one group is likely
to receive immigrants in the other education groups as well, the impact on the wage of a speciﬁc
group is a mixture of the direct competition and indirect complementarity eﬀect, and hence it need
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. We calculate average wages of each group (dependent variable) for either all individuals
(ﬁrst row) or on males only (second row). The estimated coeﬃcients in Table 5 can be interpreted
as follows: in response to an immigration shock over the 1970-2005 period, the wages of native
16dropouts experienced a negative notsigniﬁcant eﬀect while the other two groups experienced positive
signiﬁcant eﬀects. An increase in high school dropouts by ten percent due to immigration would be
associated with a one percent decrease in the wages of native high school dropouts. A ten percent
increase in the group of high school graduates implies a two percent increase in the wages of high
school graduates and a ten percent increase college graduates implies a 5% increase in the wages
of U.S.-born college graduates. The actual immigration ﬂows, however, were not a homogeneous
10% in each skill group. In the period 1990-2005, for instance, total immigration caused a 21%
increase in high school dropout employment, an 8.2% increase in high school graduate employment
and an 11.3% increase in college graduate employment. The average increase of employment due to
immigrants was 11.1%.6 That would correspond to a -2.2% change in wages of the low skill group,
a +1.6% change in the wages of the medium skill group and a +4.4% change in the wages of the
high skill group. Averaging these eﬀects by using the weights of each group in wages we obtain a
positive average eﬀect of 2.3%, conﬁrming the positive aggregate eﬀect on average wage of U.S.-born
workers originating from imperfect substitutability between native- and foreign-born workers. The
positive average eﬀect estimated in the aggregate wage (Table 1) is due to a relative eﬀect that
penalizes the low education group (as it received an inﬂow of immigrants twice as large in percentage
terms as the other two groups did) and rewards the other two groups. The estimates are not precise
enough to rule out equal positive eﬀects on the two groups of intermediate and high schooling levels.
Interestingly, the above estimates are compatible with the eﬀects of immigration on wages estimated
in Ottaviano and Peri (2006b) and are similar to those obtained in a recent paper by Kugler and
Yuksel (2006). The last paper uses the displacement eﬀect generated by Hurricane Mitch in countries
such as Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador as a ”push”-shock for immigration to the
U.S. The authors evaluate the eﬀect on U.S. wages by skill, ﬁnding essentially no eﬀects on low skill
workers and positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on the wages of U.S. workers with high school and college
education. The elasticities estimated above provide a complete empirical assessment of the impact
of immigration on wages and rents of workers of 3 diﬀerent levels of education. The next section
presents a model that can qualitatively and quantitatively explain the bulk of these eﬀects.
6Proportions across skill groups were similar in previous decades.
174T h e M o d e l
We consider a small open economy with heterogeneous individuals who supply labor and consume a
homogenous tradable good, diﬀerentiated local (nontradable) goods and housing. The heterogeneity
of individuals, relevant for their production and consumption characteristics, has two dimensions.
Individuals in the economy, whose total number is denoted by W,a r ed i ﬀerentiated both horizontally
in terms of origin (home-born H and foreign-born F) and vertically in terms of skill (schooling) level
(low L,m e d i u mM,h i g hS). This gives rise to six categories that are summarized in the following
table:
Home Foreign Total
Low skill LH LF L
Medium skill MH MF M
High skill SH SF S
Total HF W
Each worker inelastically supplies one unit of labor to the production of the homogeneous tradable
good Y and one unit of labor to the production of the varieties of the diﬀerentiated tradable good
X.W et h i n ko fY as summarizing most of the goods and services in the U.S. while X is a composite
basket of local services whose supply particularly beneﬁts from ‘ethno-cultural’ diversity, such as
restaurants, retail trade and entertainment. We will refer to X and Y as the ‘ethnic’ and ‘non-
ethnic’ goods respectively. In the production of Y ,e ﬃciency units of labor may vary across skill level
and place of origin. In the production of X,t h e yv a r yo n l ya c r o s sp l a c eo fo r i g i n .S p e c i ﬁcally, we call
1/(τkτkh), with k ∈ {L,M,S} and h ∈ {H,F},t h ee ﬃciency units of a worker of ethnicity h with
skill level k in non-ethnic production. Analogously, we call 1/τXh the eﬃciency units of a worker of
ethnicity h in ethnic production (1/τXh can be also interpreted as a quality parameter).
The economy also has an internal spatial dimension. It consists of a ‘central business district’
(henceforth, CBD) where individuals work and a linear ‘residential district’ (henceforth, RD) where
they live outside of work. Apart from housing that is oﬀered at the place of residence, all other market
transactions take place in the CBD, which occupies no land and is therefore a zero-measure point in
space. Each individual satisﬁes all her housing needs by occupying a ﬁxed lot of land and commutes
to the CBD to work and to buy goods. While the lot size is ﬁxed and normalized to unity for all
18individuals, commuting cost vary across skills depending on diﬀerent values attached to commuting
time. In particular, a member of group k ∈ {L,M,S} located at distance d from the CBD incurs a
commuting cost θk (d)
ψk where θL <θ M <θ S and ψL ≤ ψM ≤ ψS are used to capture the diﬀerent
values of commuting time across skill groups. Land belongs to a separate group of landlords who
do not work and spend their rents in the city, though they do not demand any land for themselves.
Landlords are diﬀerentiated in terms of origin with origin h owning a share ωh of the city land so
that ωH + ωF = 1. Land has no use other than for residential purposes.7
4.1 Preferences
Leaving the skill and origin indices implicit to alleviate notation whenever this does not generate




















where y is the individual’s consumption of the non-ethnic good, xH and xF are the consumptions of
the domestic (home) and foreign varieties of the ethnic good, γ>1 is their elasticity of substitution,
α>0a n dβ>0 are the expenditure shares of the non-ethic and ethnic goods, respectively, with
α + β =1 .
7As we will see, in equilibrium this set-up support a pattern of residential location in which richer individuals dwell
closer to the city center. Even though some U.S. central cities do have rich enclaves, typically high-income residents
tend to live in the suburbs. Brueckner et al (1999) present an amenity-based theory of residential location in which
t h er e l a t i v el o c a t i o no fd i ﬀerent income groups depends on the spatial pattern of amenities in a city. When, as in our
case, the center has a strong amenity advantage over the suburbs, the rich are likely to live at central locations. When
the center’s amenity advantage is weak or negative, the rich are likely to live in the suburbs. Hence, their richer set-up
ties location by income to a city’s idiosyncratic characteristics. While providing an important insight, such extension
is not crucial for our forecoming analysis as what matters from an empirical point of view will be the rent gradient
from the location of amenities (our CBD) and not the monocentricity of the residential pattern per se.
194.2 Technology
All markets are perfectly competitive. The non-ethnic good is chosen as the numeraire; it is freely
traded and its price pY is set in the external market. This good is supplied according to the following
technology:
Y = AC
where A is a total factor productivity term and C is a composite labor input that combines all skill






















where each composite input Ck (k = L,M,S) is itself a CES combination of home-born and foreign-

















The parameter δ>1 is the elasticity of substitution between workers of diﬀerent skills while
σk >δ>1 is the elasticity of substitution between workers of home and foreign origins sharing
the same level of skill k. The underlying idea is that workers are imperfectly substitutable not
only between skill groups but also within skill groups because diﬀerent origins imply diﬀerences
in speciﬁc productive abilities (i.e., due to diﬀerent sets of skills in each group from cultural or
selection reasons). The imperfect substitutability across skill (education) groups is documented
in the labor literature (Katz and Murphy, 1992, Hamermesh, 1993, Ciccone and Peri, 2005) and
the imperfect substitutability between native- and foreign-born is documented in the immigration
literature (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006b, Peri and Sparber, 2007).
The ethnic good is non-tradable outside of the small open economy. The production of ethnic
variety h requires τXh units of labor h per unit of output. Hence total supply per variety is given by:
20Xh = h/τXh =( Lh + Mh + Sh)/τXh (9)
4.3 Equilibrium
In characterizing the equilibrium of the model we bring the labor market for production in sector Y
to the forefront.
4.3.1 Labor supply
Let us call zkh the individual income net of urban costs (i.e., rental plus commuting costs), pXh the
wage that a worker of origin h earns in the production of ethnic good X so that τXhpXh is the price




1−γ + φXF (pXF)
1−γ¤ 1
1−γ (10)
where φXh ≡ (τXh)
1−γ. Then maximization of (5) subject to the budget constraint pyykh +PXxkh =
zkh gives demands:8
pyykh = αzkh, PXxkh = βzkh, xkh = φXH (pXh)
−γ (PX)
γ−1 βzkh (11)







where Vkh is the utility level for workers of skill k and ethnicity h which isﬁxed to some exogenous
level determined by the average utility that a worker of type k and ethnicity h would enjoy if she
migrated elsewhere.
In the RD workers are symmetrically located around the CBD, i.e. (S + M + L)/2o ft h e mo n
each side of the CBD. In equilibrium workers have to be indiﬀerent about their residential distance
8We have speciﬁed the subscript kh for the variables x and y to make clear that the levels of consumption of the
two goods and the indirect utility of individuals depends on their income zkh that varies with skill and ethnicity.
21from the CBD with workers who value commuting time more located closer to the CBD (Fujita
and Thisse, 2002). Given our assumptions, this implies a segregated equilibrium in which skills
endogenously separate in six quarters (three on each side of the CBD) with higher skills residing
closer to the CBD.
Since the lot size is normalized to one, the border between S and M is at distance S/2f r o mt h e
CBD, the border between M and L is at distance (S + M)/2, the end of the residential district is
at distance (S + M + L)/2. Accordingly, the most remote L resident is located at that distance
and incurs a commuting cost equal to θL [(S + M + L)/2]
ψL. Since land has no alternative use other
than for residential purposes, land rent is nil for that resident rL ((S + M + L)/2) = 0. If located
at generic distance d ∈ ((S + M)/2,(S + M + L)/2), the L-skill worker would instead incur urban
costs consisting of land rent rL(d) and commuting cost θL(d)
ψL.I n d i ﬀerence then requires land rents
to oﬀset any commuting cost diﬀerential rL(d)=θL [(S + M + L)/2]
ψL − θL(d)
ψL.A c c o r d i n g l y ,
wherever they are located in their quarter, all L workers face the same urban costs:
gL = rL(d)+θL (d)
ψL = θL[(S + M + L)/2]
ψL (13)
Analogously, M w o r k e r sh a v et ob ei n d i ﬀerent between locating at distance (S+M)/2 where they pay
the marginal rent rM((S + M)/2) = rL((S + M)/2) or at any other distance d ∈ (S/2,(S + M)/2)
in their quarter. This requires the land rent diﬀerential to oﬀset any commuting cost diﬀerential
rM(d) − rL((S + M)/2) = θM [(S + M)/2]
ψM − θM (d)
ψM. Hence, using (13), we obtain
gM = rM(d)+θM (d)
ψM = gL + θM [(S + M)/2]
ψM − θL [(S + M)/2]
ψL (14)
Finally, when applied to the S group, a similar procedure allows us to write:
gS = gM + θS (S/2)
ψS − θM (S/2)
ψM (15)
Hence, the net income of a worker of skill k and origin h amounts to:
zkh = wkh + pXh − gk (16)
22where wkh is the wage from non-ethnic production and pXh is the income from ethnic production.
Given the individual rents rk(d) implied by (13), (14) and (15), in equilibrium total land rents
paid by the three skill groups add up to the following:
RL =2
R (S+M+L)/2


































with home- and foreign-born landlords in each skill group receiving shares ωH and 1−ωH respectively.








Given supply (9) and demand (11), market clearing for the ethnic good requires:
Xh = h = φXh(pXh)
−γ (PX)
γ−1 βZ (19)
Together with (12), (13), (14), (15), (17) and (16), (19) gives us enough equations to characterize
the equilibrium relations between wkh and kh; that is, the non-ethnic labor supplies. Intuition is
served by using (16) together with (12) to write non-ethnic inverse labor supply as:
wkh = e Vkh(PX)
β − pXh + gk (20)
with e Vkh ≡ Vkhα−αβ
−β (pY)
α where pY = 1 by our choice of numeraire. Condition (20) shows that
the local supply of workers kh increases with their wage wkh and is shifted by changes in the outside
option e Vkh, the price index of non-tradables PX, ethnic earnings pXh and urban costs gk. When the
outside option, the non-tradable prices and urban costs increase and the earnings from ethnic services
decreases, a given local supply of workers kh can only be maintained provided they are oﬀered higher
non-ethnic wages.
234.3.2 Labor Demand
Turning to ﬁrms in the non-ethnic sector, proﬁt maximization requires:




































are the price indices associated with the quantity indices C and Ck/τk, respectively, σk is the eth-
nic elasticity of substitution within skill level k while φk ≡ (τk)
1−δ and φkh ≡ (τkh)
1−σk capture
productivity diﬀerences across groups.

































































































Demand for labor of skill k and origin h can be derived by merging (21), (24), (25), (26) and (27).
This gives:














24which is a labor demand schedule showing the wage wkh as a downward sloping function of employ-
ment kh.M o r e o v e r , f o r g i v e n kh ﬁrms are willing to pay higher wages if C grows or Ck falls. In
the former case, a proportionate increase of employment across skills raises all groups’ productivity
due to complementarities in production. In the latter, a proportionate increase of the employed of a
certain skill across origins reduces the productivity of workers of that skill as more workers of that
skill are combined with a given stock of workers of diﬀerent skill (since δ<σ k).
5 From Theory to Numbers: Calibration, Validation and
Simulation
When putting the demand (28) and the supply (20) of non-ethnic labor together, our model yields
no general prediction on the impact of immigration on rents and wages of home-born workers. The
reason for this is the presence of several countervailing eﬀects on both the supply and demand sides.
Immigration alters non-tradable prices, urbanc o s t sa n de a r n i n g sf r o me t h n i cs e r v i c e s ;i ta ﬀects
the balance between the complementarities and substitutability of workers in ethnic and non-ethnic
production. We therefore ask a more speciﬁcq u e s t i o n :What are the implied eﬀects of the observed
immigration to an average U.S. local economy when our model is calibrated to average U.S. data and
uses estimated parameter values?
In so doing we start by calibrating the model to the conditions in the U.S. in the year 1990,
assuming that at that time the local economy was in equilibrium. We then take the immigration
ﬂows of foreign-born during the period 1990-2005 as an exogenous shock and see how the calibrated
model reacts. In the simulations we focus on the ‘long-run’ eﬀects of immigration on U.S.-born
residents, namely the impact on wages and rents of native workers of diﬀerent education levels once
they have adjusted by moving in or out of the local economy to maintain their pre-immigration
utility.
Formally, we proceed as follows. The substitution of (10) and (13)-(18) in (19), (28) and (20) gives
us a system of 14 equations. We take the values of kh’s that describe the distribution of natives and
foreign-born by skill among U.S. metropolitan workers as initially given and equal to their value in
1990. Standardizing total employment to 1, the values we use are as follows: LH =0 .10,M H =0 .54,
25SH =0 .25 so that H =0 .89, and LF =0 .035,M F =0 .044,S F =0 .027 so that F =0 .106. We then
impose that for each skill group the share of urban costs in gross income mirrors its observed value
λ,t h a ti s :




The Consumer Expenditure Survey, available from Bureau of Labor Statistics (2005) allows us to
c a l c u l a t et h es h a r eo fi n c o m es p e n to nh o u s i n gs e r v i ces plus local transportation by the average U.S.
family and we take this as estimate of the parameter λ, capturing the share of urban costs in a
family’s income.9 The conditions above give us three additional equations and bring the number of
equations to 17. We simultaneously solve this system to ﬁnd the 17 endogenous variables (six wkh,for
k = S,M,L and h = H,F, two pXh,f o rh = H,F,six Vkh for k = S,M,L and h = H,F and three
θk,for k = S,M,L). By so doing we get the initial values of wkh and pXh that we use to construct
real wages and real rents and the calibrated values for Vkh (indirect utility for each group) and θk
(unit cost of commuting for each group) that we maintain henceforth.
Once we calculate the initial equilibrium relative to year 1990 as described above, we let the
supply of foreign-born of each skill increase in percentage terms to mirror the inﬂow of foreign-born
as experienced by the average U.S. state over the period 1990-2005. This inﬂow is described by
the following changes in foreign-born employment in the average U.S. state: ∆F/(F + H)=0 .11,
∆LF/(LF + LH)=0 .244, ∆MF/(MF + MH)=0 .082, ∆SF/(SF + SH)=0 .116.10 In the long-run
native workers can move in response to immigrant inﬂows. Therefore in the new equilibrium the k0
H
are determined endogenously using the corresponding supply function. This gives us a system of 11
equations (two price equations, 19, six labor demand equations, 28, and three labor supply equations,
20, for native workers only) that can be solved in the 11 unknowns (six wkh’s for k = S,M,L and
h = H,F,t w opXh’s for h = H,F, and three kH’s for k = S,M,L). In order to translate the eﬀect
of immigration on the price of land into the income of foreign and native land owners we assume
that the land of each type (skill group) is owned by U.S.- and foreign-born individuals in the same
proportion as house ownership shares in the group. The data from Census 1990 allows us to calculate
9The share of housing costs as of year 2000 was in the range of 0.15-0.20 and the share of transport costs was
0.10-0.20. We use a value of 0.3 as a reasonable approximation of the sum of those two, measuring the share of family
expenditure in urban costs that account for housing and commuting.
10These numbers refer to changes in the metropolitan population (i.e. employment in urban areas) only and ﬁtt h e
logic of the theoretical model.
26the ownership rate by education group for natives and immigrants. Hence, as the ownership rate in
each group is higher among natives than among immigrants (see Figure 4) the share of land in each
group assigned to natives is larger than their fraction in the population. This assumption implies
that the ownership of rental houses in each skill group mirrors the overall ownership of houses in
that group. Low skilled natives and foreign-born landlords own houses in the low-skilled district and
rent them out to low-skilled native and immigrant workers. Following these assumptions as of 1990,
11% of the the stock of existing houses for low skilled belonged to foreign-born (and 89% to natives),
5% of medium skill-houses belonged to foreign born (and 95% to natives) and 8% of the high-skilled
houses belonged to foreign-owned and the remaining 92% to natives.
The parameters of the utility function are obtained using the property of the Cobb-Douglas
functional form which implies that the share of household expenditures on non-tradable services is
equal to β. The Consumer Expenditure Survey, available at Bureau of Labor Statistics (2005) allows
us to calculate the share of income spent by the average U.S. family on ”food outside the house”
and ”entertainment”. We interpret those two sectors as those local (nontradeable) services in which
ethnic diversity matter most. Henc ew ec a no b t a i na ne s t i m a t eo fβ from their share in expenditures,
which ranges from 0.15 to 0.20 for the average U.S. household. We choose β =0 .15 as a base-value.11
The parameter λ that captures the share of household expenditures on residential costs (housing +
commuting) is chosen to be 0.30 as described above. The estimates of the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign-born workers in production of Y that we use are in the range of the
estimates obtained in Ottaviano and Peri (2006) for the U.S. and in Peri (2007) for the state of
California. We use values of 5 and 6 (for the aggregate U.S. the Ottaviano and Peri, 2006, estimates
can be as high as 10 while for California that parameter is usually 5 or smaller)12 considering a
scenario with σk = 5 for each education group, one with σk = 6 for each education group and one
where we allowed closer substitutability in the group of less educated workers σL =1 0 . A sf o rt h e
substitutability between the non-tradable services provided by the U.S. and foreign born, we assume
that it would be within the range of the substitutability of natives and foreign-born in production of
11We checked the robustness of results for β =0 .2. The variables of interest are not sensitive to this parameter.
Simulations are available upon request.
12We also used our state panel data, three education groups and the imputed immigration instrumental variable to
calculate the relative wage elasticity of natives and immigrants. We estimate values for (1/σ) in the vicinity of 0.15,
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. This implies values of σ in the vicinity of 6 and signiﬁcantly imperfect substitutability
between natives and foreign-born workers of same education level.
27Y . Hence we use the value of 7 (we also used values of 6 and 8 with very similar results). Finally, the
elasticity of transport costs to distance from the central business district is taken from the literature.
There are several studies estimating the rent gradient of residential houses as a function of their
distance to the central city location. Those studies identify a smaller and less precisely estimated
elasticity of housing price to distance from the center of the region, as distance increases. In our
model the group of high and medium educated individuals are closer to the central business district
so that for them we use the estimates found in the recent study by Osland et al. (2007), in line with
previous studies and implying ψS =0 .50 and ψM =0 .50. For less educated individuals, farther from
the center we use a range of values for their elasticity of rents to distance from the center. Those
values range from low, ψS =0 .05, following the notion that farther from the center distance matters
less for rents (as argued in Osland et al., 2007) to large, ψS =0 .6. As we will see below, using very
low elasticities for ψS implies that the model does not match the eﬀect of immigration on rents of
less educated workers very well. We prefer a relatively high elasticity with the downside of slightly
over-predicting the long-run eﬀect on wages of less educated workers.
In the production of the traded good (7) we assume an elasticity between skill groups of δ =2
which is consistent with most of the literature.13 T h er e l a t i v ee ﬃciencies of the factors (1/τk)
are chosen to match the average U.S. wage premia in 1990 between education groups, given their
relative supplies and the elasticity of substitution δ. Standardizing the eﬃciency of low skilled




















,w h e r ewk is the average national wage for native workers of education k,
and Ek is the total supply of native workers of education group k. The relative eﬃciency of foreign-
t oU . S . - b o r nb o t hi na n ys k i l lg r o u pa n di nt h ep r o d u c t i o no fl o c a ls e r v i c e sh a sb e e ns e te q u a lt o1 .
5.1 Average Eﬀects
Table 6 and 7 summarize the results of the simulations over the range of parameter values described
above. Table 6 reports the eﬀects of immigration on average variables: wages, rents, employment
and housing income, obtained by aggregating the three education groups. Table 7 reports the eﬀects
on wages, rents and housing income relative to each skill group. The upper part of Table 6 shows the
13E.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), Hamermesh (1993), Angrist (1995), Ciccone and Peri (2005).
28choices for the key parameters, and the diﬀerences across columns reﬂect the elasticity of substitution
between natives and immigrants in the production of Y , and the elasticity of rents to distance for the
group of less educated workers. The ﬁrst parameter regulates the strength of the complementarity
eﬀects of immigrants on natives (the smaller the elasticity the larger the eﬀect) and the second
regulates the sensitivity of housing prices to distance for less educated workers. The rest of Table 6 is
organized as follows. The three rows labelled ”Long-Run Elasticity” present the simulated long-run
elasticity of average wage, rents and employment for natives. The following section labelled ”Long-
Run Percentage Eﬀects of Immigration” translates the elasticities into predicted percentage eﬀects
given the actual immigration ﬂow between 1990 and 2005. The last column of Table 6 is labelled
”Empirical Estimates”. In the ﬁrst ten rows it reports the parameter estimates and their sources,
while in the following rows, corresponding to each variable (wages, house rents, employment) it shows
the elasticity estimates from Section 3 above. A comparison of the simulated values (column 1 to 4)
with the range of estimated values (reported in the last column) allows us to assess how successful
the model is at quantitatively matching the eﬀects identiﬁed by our empirical analysis. Considering
Column (I), that uses an elasticity of substitution of 5 between native and foreign-born and ψL =0 .6,
the model predicts that a long-run inﬂow of immigrant workers equal to 1% of employment increases
wages of natives by 0.34%, on average. This positive eﬀect is due to complementarities in production.
At the same time, that inﬂow of immigrants produces and increase of housing prices equal to 0.68%
because it increases competition for desirable housing (near the CBD) and indirectly for land at any
distance from the CBD. These wage and rent eﬀects (in the long run) accrue with the following
dynamics: as immigrants ﬂow into the state, the average productivity of workers increases and house
prices increase as well. Given our model, the short-run impact on housing costs and wages produces a
s m a l li n c r e a s ei nt h ea v e r a g er e a lw a g eo fn a t i v e s .I fw o r k e r sa r ef r e et om o v ea n da s s u m i n gt h a tt h e y
were in equilibrium in 1990 they will ﬂow into the state to take advantage of higher consumption
wages. Immigration causes an increase of native employment due to inﬂow from other states by
0.36%. This inﬂow shifts up land and house prices at any given distance from the CBD and therefore
pushes out the boundary of the region. The simulated eﬀect of immigration on the rents plotted
against the distance from the CBD is reported in Figure 5. The lower (red) line represents the rent
level before the immigration shock and the kinks represent the boundaries between diﬀerent quarters
29inhabited by people of diﬀerent skills. The upper line is the rent after immigration. The increased
value of central land shifts the rent for all groups, but as we move away from the business district the
eﬀect is smaller. Hence the new equilibrium is reached with immigration of natives and expansion of
the boundaries of the city area. While real wages for each group return to the pre-immigration level,
as a consequence of natives arbitraging away real wage diﬀerences with the rest of the country, the
real income of natives (i.e., worker wages plus house rental income to landlords) increases as land is
now worth more. Housing income accrues to landlords who are primarily natives and this accounts
for their higher income.
Three things must be noted about the simulation results. First, the eﬀect on the cost of housing
aﬀects natives through two channels: on theone hand, it increases the cost of living, and on the
other, it increases rent paid to house owners (i.e., landlords). While the ﬁrst eﬀect hurts the real
income of natives, the second helps it as natives own houses in much larger proportions than foreign-
born. The idea of separate landlords in the model helps us to separate these two eﬀects on native
residents. As immigrant destination cities become more expensive due to higher rents, workers of
all skills are hurt, though house owners of all skill levels enjoy an oﬀsetting positive income eﬀect.
The second thing to notice is that the change in wages and house prices on impact (not reported)
result in a positive eﬀect on real wages that attracts (a small fraction of) additional natives to the
immigrant receiving area. The third observation is that the housing income of natives in real terms
increases after the adjustment (by 0.67%). This fact coupled with the zero-change in the real wage
of natives due to their ability to move, implies that the change in total income to natives in the
locality is positive, and ultimately captures the increased value of land because of higher population
and higher production. Relative to 1990-2005 immigration, we see that the long-run average increase
in native wage due to immigration is 3.8%, the increase in rent (and owner income) for the average
house is 7.6% and the increase in employment/population of the city is almost 4%. Notice that the
simulations of Column (I) are within the range of estimated elasticities (and percentage eﬀects) in
the last column. Our simple model explains why immigration increases average wages and rents in
the long-run and produces very reasonable average eﬀects, compatible with our estimates.
The results reported in Column (II) are obtained from a simulation of the economy assuming that
the σ elasticities equal 6 rather than 5. The main changes implied by this higher substitutability
30between native- and foreign-born is a smaller eﬀect on wages and house value in the long-run, accom-
panied by a smaller inﬂow of natives to the state. On impact (not reported), average real wages of
natives increase slightly, so only a small group moves into the state. In the long-run, real income from
rents to native landlords increases by 6.45%. Column (III) restores the value σ = 5 and decreases the
elasticity of rents to distance for the less educated group to 0.4. This reduces the response of rents and
wages in equilibrium to the immigration inﬂow, while inducing the higher inﬂows of natives (4.67% of
employment) to re-establish equilibrium. Such variation does not seem to move the elasticities in the
right direction as the response of wages and rents is now relatively small while the native migration
response is relatively large. Finally, speciﬁcation (IV) shows that reducing the distance-elasticity of
rent for less educated to 0.05 and increasing their elasticity of substitution with natives to 10, the
average eﬀect on house prices and rent is excessively small and the eﬀect on migration becomes quite
large. While the diﬀerences are not too large in order of magnitude, the simulations seem to suggest
that the parameter choices in Column (I) best ﬁt the estimated elasticities.
Comparing the simulated elasticities of Column (I) to the estimated ones we can say that our
model does a good job in explaining the eﬀect of immigration on average wages and average rents:
the simulated elasticities for both variables are in the range of the estimated ones. Even considering
the highest values in the range, the simulated model explains 60-80% of those eﬀects. The ”com-
plementarity” story explains the bulk of the average wage and rent eﬀects estimated in section 3.1 .
Finally, the simulations produce migration responses of natives that are positive but not too large.
They are closer to our OLS estimates than to our IV estimates but are certainly compatible with
both once we account for the standard errors.
5.2 Eﬀects by Skill
Table 7 presents the eﬀects of immigration on the wages, rents and real rent income of natives in
diﬀerent skill groups. We report the long-run elasticity of (nominal) wages and rents to immigration
and the percentage eﬀect on real rental income for landlords. The ﬁrst six rows present elasticities that
can be directly compared to those estimated in section 3. As in Table 6, for ease of comparison the
range of empirical estimates is reported in the last column of the table. The speciﬁcations (I) through
(IV) mirror those of Table 6 in that they use the same parameter combinations in the simulations.
31Column (I) uses the speciﬁcation that performed best in matching the average eﬀects. All in all, this
is also the best speciﬁcation to account for the elasticity of education-speciﬁc wages and rents, with
the exception of the less educated group. Simulation (I) yields elasticities of wages and rents for the
group with intermediate education (M) that are within the estimated range, for the group of highly
educated (S) the estimates are very close to the lower boundary of the range, and for the group of
less educated (L) they are too large. The model predicts an excessively positive reaction of wages
and rents of less educated natives to immigration. While increasing the substitutability of workers
(speciﬁcations II and IV) and decreasing the sensitivity of rents to distance (speciﬁcations III and
IV) reduces the wage eﬀe c tt ob ec l o s et ot h ee s t i m a t e dr a n g e( e s s e n t i a l l yc l o s et o0 )i ta l s oi n c r e a s e s
the rent response in the wrong direction (large increase in rent of less educated). The estimated small
response of the rent of less educated workers to immigration, in spite of large inﬂo w so fi m m i g r a n t si n
the group, may be due to worsening housing quality consumed by natives, an increase in the supply
of houses at a given distance to the center or to other factors not captured in the model.
Finally, the last three rows of Table 7 show that in the long run, native landlords in any skill
group experienced a signiﬁcant increase in their total real income from rents. As workers arbitrage
away the eﬀect of immigration on real wages in the long-run by moving, the positive eﬀect on housing
income is the only remaining long-run net eﬀect in the city. While the simulated housing income
eﬀect is likely to be too large for the group of less educated (as the simulations overstate the rent
change relative to the estimates), for the other two groups those increases in real income are quite
close to the actual ones. Hence house ownership is another channel through which natives with
any level of education may beneﬁt from immigration. The simulation says that if the average less
educated native worker is also the average owner of dwellings rented by immigrants in that group
(as, for instance, she sublets to them) then she will have a substantial positive eﬀect on her income
through the supplemental rent income received. To the extent that less educated older natives own
dwellings in parts of cities where the increased demand from immigrants has contributed to making
rents quite high (such as San Francisco or New York, for instance), this is certainly a relevant source
of income and transfer from immigrants to natives that has been unaccounted for to date.
325.3 Counterfactuals Scenarios
Overall Tables 6 and 7 show that our simple model matches remarkably well some key moments in
the data that are not used for calibration. This validation suggests that the model can be used as a
useful tool for policy analysis when the aim is the evaluation of the impacts of alternative immigration
scenarios on U.S. wages and rents. As an illustration, in Table 8 we report the results for several
counterfactual scenarios. In the ﬁrst (column II), we use our calibrated model to assess the eﬀects of
immigration on the average U.S. state removing the undocumented from the pool of immigrants. In
this scenario we make the extreme assumption that the undocumented immigrants over the period
1990-2005 were concentrated in the group of workers with no high school diploma. This is certainly
an overstatement as Passel (2005) reports that between 25 and 35% of unauthorized immigrants as of
2005 had a high school degree or more. Our assumption implies that, not allowing the undocumented,
the inﬂow of less educated is reduced to roughly one third of the actual one while the inﬂows of
medium and high skill migrants are not altered. In the second type of scenarios (columns III-VII),
we ask what would have happened to the average U.S. state if this had alternatively experienced
the same immigration patterns as some key states at the center of the immigration debate. These
are California (column III), New Jersey (column V), New Mexico (column VII), New York (column
VI) and Texas (column IV).14 For ease of comparison, Column (I) reports the results for the actual
average immigration ﬂows from the benchmark columns I of Tables 6 and 7.
With respect to the actual average inﬂows, the California scenario is biased towards high skill
immigrants. The “documented only”, the New York and the New Jersey ones even more so. All
entail a smaller overall shock with respect to California, especially in the case of New York. In
general in the scenarios with larger immigration of highly educated the outcomes are a weaker positive
reaction of average native wages, but a larger positive eﬀect on wages of less educated and a stronger
positive reaction of average natives rents. As the housing market among highly educated drives the
average eﬀect, inﬂow of highly educated workers has stronger positive eﬀect on average rents The
decomposition of the wage and rent eﬀects by skill groups shows that competition in the housing
market gets tougher in the states with highly educated immigrants (scenario V and VI) and the
percentage increase in rents of the two more educat e dg r o u p si sm u c hh i g h e rt h a nf o rl e s se d u c a t e d
14As before, in all scenarios we consider the changes in the metropolitan population only.
33ones. At the same time nominal wages of less educated increase by more than for more educated
triggering inﬂow of less educated natives. The states that receive more highly educated immigrants
tend to end up, for complementariety reasons with more less educated natives as well. Incidentally
this diﬀerential attraction of natives by skill group is the reason that the eﬀect on average wage of
natives in those states that received more highly educated immigrants is smaller than the wage eﬀect
for each skill group (composition shifted towards more educated). To the contrary for those states
receiving less educated immigrants the average wage eﬀect for natives is larger than for each individual
group (composition shifted towards more educated). In the California scenario vis-a-vis New York or
New Jersey, a lot of low-skill immigrants arrived and this explains why the corresponding results are
milder than in the New York and the New Jersey scenarios. In this respect, the “documented only”,
(II) is an intermediate scenario. Turning to New Mexico, the state with the strongest immigration
of less educated, in relative terms, we observe impact on average wages and rents opposite to the
New Jersey one. The large inﬂow of less educated induced immigration mainly of highly educated
natives (for complementariety reasons) and still the eﬀects on average rents and rents of the two
most educated groups were milder than in scenario I. The large positive average wage eﬀect is the
combination of positive complementariety eﬀects and attraction of highly educated natives. Finally,
the Texas scenario is roughly a scaled-up version of the actual one. As it retains a fairly similar
distribution across skill groups, the corresponding results are the closest to those in column I.
All in all, the simulated scenarios stress the crucial role played by the matching between native and
immigrant skills in terms of both the average eﬀect and their distribution across skill groups. They
also emphasize the important eﬀects on rents of highly educated immigration: in some states (such
as California and New-York) the simulated values (close to 10% increases) suggest that immigration
of highly skilled could be considered an important cause of the housing boom of the nineties. They
also reveal the importance of a general equilibrium approach to evaluating the eﬀects of immigration
as the associated shocks are absorbed not only in the wages of the natives but also in their rents and
employment levels.
346 Conclusions
This paper revisits the so called ”area analysis” approach to immigration in a number of ways. First,
it extends the focus of analysis from the labor market (only) to the housing market and the migratory
response of natives. Second, it proposes a general equilibrium integrated approach to understanding
the eﬀects of immigrants on wages, prices and rents for the average individual as well as for individuals
in each skill group. Third, it allows for a more accurate and complete welfare analysis of immigration
on U.S. natives. Usually only the simple wage eﬀects are considered while this paper, by deﬁning real
wages, prices and housing income, accounts for the combined local price eﬀects and rent eﬀects on the
income of native individuals. Fourth, we combine a regression approach that empirically identiﬁes a
set of elasticities that characterize the impact of immigration on wages and rents and a simulation
approach with a simple model of rational native agents responding to changes in skill supplies due
to immigration. We analyze the predicted variations of wages and prices between equilibria before
and after immigration, and the results that we obtain are novel primarily in two respects. On one
hand, we document empirically and explain theoretically the existence of a strong positive average
correlation between immigration and wages/housing prices for natives. On the other, we analyze the
eﬀects on wages and rents for native workers of diﬀering education levels. Speciﬁcally, the group of
low skilled workers experiences a small negative wage eﬀect from immigrants and a small positive rent
eﬀect. For those less skilled workers who own their house the positive house value eﬀect more than
compensates for their decreasing nominal wages. For more skilled workers, immigration produces a
positive eﬀect on their wages and a large positive eﬀect on the price of their house. As most native
workers in this group own their house, the long-run eﬀect of immigration for this group’s real income
is strongly positive. Our results are long-run eﬀe c t ss i n c en a t i v ew o r k e r sa r ef r e et oa r b i t r a g ea w a y
real wage diﬀerentials by moving. In this case, the most relevant long-run eﬀect accruing to the local
open economy is in the form of higher rents and higher house values. Finally we use our model to
evaluate the eﬀect on wages and rents of some counterfactual scenarios.
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1  
Immigration and Changes in the Average Wage of U.S. Natives 
U.S. states, decade changes 1970-2000 and 2000-2005. 
 


































Notes: The units of observation are the 50 U.S. states and DC during the periods 1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000 and 2000-2005 for a total 
of 204 observations. The vertical axis measures the percentage change in average weekly wage in constant 2000 U.S. $ for U.S.-born 
males, 17 to 65 years of age, cleaned of the common period-specific average. The horizontal axis measures the change in foreign-born 
employment as percentage of initial total employment cleaned of the common period-specific average.  
 
Slope: 0.45 (0.10),  
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Immigration and Changes in the Median Rent of U.S. Natives  
U.S. states, decade changes 1970-2000 and 2000-2005. 




































Notes: The units of observation are the 50 U.S. states and D.C. during the periods 1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000 and 2000-2005 for a 
total of 204 observations. The vertical axis measures the percentage change in rent per room in constant 2000 U.S. $ for U.S.-born 
head of households, cleaned of the common period-specific average. The horizontal axis measures the change in foreign-born 
population as percentage of initial total employment cleaned of the common period-specific average.  
Slope: 0.80 (0.16), 
R
2=0.12   41
 
Figure 3: 
Net Immigration (1990-2005) as Share of the 1990 Population by Group: Three Education Groups 

































Notes: Each bar of the graph represents the change in foreign-born workers by education group (net immigration) during the 1990-
2005 period as a percentage of the total population in the group.      42
Figure 4: 
Ownership of Residential Space, 1990 
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Note: Rent as a function of distance from the central business district (d).  The red line corresponds to the simulated rent function in 
1990 using the parameters in Column (I) of Table 6. The green line corresponds to the simulated rent function after immigration 1990-
2005 and after the adjustment of native workers.  
 




Estimates of the Elasticity of Average Wage of Natives to Immigration, 
Panel of U.S. States plus DC: 1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000 and 2000-2005 Changes  
 
γwage  Weekly Wages  Yearly Wages 
Specification 1  2  3  4 
Sample  Male Only  All Workers  Male Only  All Workers 
Whole State 










IV, imputed supply-driven 
























Metropolitan Areas Only 










IV, imputed supply-driven 
























Observations 204  204  204  204 
 
Notes: Units of observation: 50 U.S. states plus DC during the periods 1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000 and 2000-2005. Observations 
are weighted by the employment of that cell in each regression. Dependent variable: percentage change in the real (CPI deflated) 
average wage of natives, between 17 and 65 years of age. Explanatory variable: change of foreign-born employment as percentage 
of initial employment in the state. All regressions include period fixed effects. The OLS estimates control for the change in native 
employment as percentage of total initial employment. The IV estimates use as instruments the imputed change in foreign-born 
population 17-65 as percentage of initial population in the age-range.  The method to construct imputed foreign-born population 
changes by state is described in the main text. The top three rows include workers in the whole state while those in the bottom three 
rows include only workers in metropolitan areas of each state. Each coefficient results from a separate estimation. We report 
heteroskedasitcity-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
 





Estimates of the Elasticity of Rent/House Value of Natives to Immigration, 
U.S. States plus DC: 1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000 and 2000-2005 Changes 
 
Notes: Unit of observation: 50 U.S. states plus DC during the periods 1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000 and 2000-2005. Observations are 
weighted for the employment in that cell in each regression. Dependent variable: percentage change in the real (CPI deflated) median/average 
rent per room or real median/average house price of native head of households, between 17 and 65 years of age. Explanatory variable: change 
of foreign-born population as percentage of initial population in the state (age 17-65). The OLS estimates control for the change in native 
population as percentage of total initial population. The IV estimates use as instruments the imputed change in foreign-born population 17-65 
as percentage of initial population in the age-range.  Method to construct imputed foreign-born population changes by state is described in the 
main text. The top three rows include workers in the whole state, while those in the bottom three rows include only workers in metropolitan 
areas of each state. Each coefficient results from a separate estimation. We report heteroskedasitcity-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
γhouse price   Dependent Variable: Rent per room  Dependent Variable:  
Housing Price per room 
Specification 1  2  3  4 
Measure of Dependent Variable:  Average Median  Average  Median 
Whole State 



































Metropolitan Areas Only 







































Estimates of the Elasticity of U.S.-born Population/Employment of Natives to Immigration  





















Notes: Unit of observation: 50 U.S. states plus D.C during the periods 1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000 and 2000-2005. 
Observations are weighted for the employment in that cell in each regression. Dependent variable: Change in population 
(employment) of natives between 17 and 65 years as percentage of initial total population (employment) in the state. 
Explanatory Variable: change in population (employment) of foreign-born between 17 and 65 as percentage of initial 
population (employment) in the state. The IV estimates use as instruments the imputed change in foreign-born population 17-
65 as percentage of initial population in the age-range.  Method to construct imputed foreign-born population changes by state 
is described in the main text. Each coefficient results from a separate estimation. We report heteroskedasitcity-robust standard 
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Table 4 
Estimates of the Elasticity of Rent/House Value of Natives to Immigration, by Native Skill 
U.S. States plus DC: 1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000 and 2000-2005 Changes 
 
Notes: Unit of observation: 50 U.S. states plus DC during the periods 1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000 and 2000-2005. Observations are 
weighted for the population in the cell in each regression. Dependent variable: yearly percentage change in the median real rent per room or 
real median price per room of native head of households. The mean and median are constructed including individuals between 17 and 65 years 
of age, with schooling level described by  the column header. Explanatory variable: change of foreign-born population as percentage of initial 
population in the state and in the education group (age 17-65). The OLS estimates control for the change in native population in the education 
group as percentage of total initial population in the group. The IV estimates use as instruments the imputed change in foreign-born population 
17-65 in the education group as percentage of initial population in the age-range.  The top three rows include workers in the whole state, those 
in the bottom three rows include only workers in metropolitan areas of each state. Each coefficient results from a separate estimation. We 
report heteroskedasitcity-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Specification 1  2  3 
Group, by Education  Low Education 
(High School Dropouts) 
Medium Education 
(High School Graduates) 
High Education 
(College Graduates) 
Metropolitan Areas Only 














































































Estimates of the Elasticity of Wages of Natives to Immigration, 
Separated by Skill of Worker 

















Notes: Unit of observation: 50 U.S. states plus D.C during the periods 1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000 and 2000-2005. Observations 
are weighted for the employment of that cell in each regression. Dependent Variable: yearly percentage change in the average wage 
of natives, between 17 and 65 years of age, with schooling as in the column header. Explanatory Variable: change of foreign-born 
employment as percentage of initial employment in the state and schooling group as in the header. All regressions include period 
fixed effects. The IV estimates use as instruments the imputed change in foreign-born population 17-65 in a schooling group as 
percentage of initial population in the education-state group.  Method to construct imputed foreign-born population changes by state 
is described in the main text. Each coefficient results from a separate estimation. We report heteroskedasitcity-robust standard errors 
in parentheses. 
 
Specification 1 2  3 
Method:  Low Education  Medium Education  High Education 
Whole State 
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Table 6 
Simulated Long-Run Average Impact of Immigration 1990-2005: 
Elasticity of Wages, Housing Values and Population of Natives 
 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  Empirical  Estimates 
Parameter Values 
share spent in housing + 
commuting 
0.30 0.30  0.30 0.30  0.15-0.2 housing  
0.1-0.15 commuting 
Source BLS (2005) 
β (share spent in entertainment-
food) 
0.15 0.15  0.15 0.15  0.15-0.2 
Source BLS (2005) 
γ (elasticity of substitution ethnic 
goods)  
7 7  7 7  Between 5 and 10 
By analogy with σ 
δ (elasticity of substitution 
education groups) 
2 2  2 2  1.5-2.2  
Source: Ciccone and Peri 
(2005) 
ψL  0.60 0.60  0.40 0.05  Imprecisely Estimated  
ψM  0.50 0.50  0.50 0.50  Around 0.50 
Source: Osland et al 
(2007) 
ψS  0.50 0.50  0.50 0.50  Around 0.50 
Source: Osland et al 
(2007) 
σL  5 6  5 10  5 to 10 
Source: Ottaviano and 
Peri (2006) 
σM  5 6  5 5  5 to 10 
Source: Ottaviano and 
Peri (2006) 
σS  5 6  5 5  5 to 10 
Source: Ottaviano and 
Peri (2006) 
Long-Run Elasticity 
γwage natives  0.345  0.312  0.283  0.178  0.34 to 0.56 
γrent natives  0.680  0.580  0.632  0.540  0.60 to 0.81 
γ employment natives  0.359  0.130  0.420  0.532  -0.35 to 0.38 
Long-Run Percentage Effects of Immigration 
Average Wage of Natives  3.84  3.47  3.16  1.98  3.7% to 6.2% 
Average Rent of Natives  7.56  6.45  7.03  6.01  6.7% to 9% 
Total Employment of Natives  3.99 1.44  4.67 5.93  -3.8  %to  4.2% 
 
Note: Total immigration in the 1990-2005 period: ΔF/(F+H)=11.1%, distributed as ΔLF/(LF+LH)= 24.4%, 
ΔMF/(MF+MH)= 8.2%,  ΔSF/(SF+SH)= 11.6%. Simulations are described in the main text. The elasticities are relative 
to the percentage change in the group due to immigration.    50
 
Table 7 
Simulated Long-Run Impact of Immigration by Skill:   
Elasticity of Wages, Housing Values and Population of Natives 
 
 




Parameter Values: Same as Above 
 
Long-Run Elasticities 
γwage natives Low Skills  0.255  0.210  0.168  0.007  -0.08 to -0.10 
γwage natives Medium Skills  0.206  0.168  0.199  0.187  0.20 to 0.23** 
γwage natives High Skills  0.210  0.171  0.103  0.192  0.42 to 0.50** 
γrent price natives Low Skills  0.573  0.464  0.767  1.020  0.15 to 0.30 
γrent price natives Medium Skills  0.610  0.517  0.616  0.606  0.62 to 1.90** 
γrent price natives High Skills  0.638 0.542  0.638 0.635  0.87  to1.87** 
Long-Run Percentage Effects of Immigration 
Real Rent  Low Skills  6.33 5.22  8.60 11.62  Not  observed 
Real Rent Medium Skills  6.74 5.81  6.92 7.01  Not  observed 
Real Rent High Skills  7.05 6.09  7.16 7.33  Not  observed 
 
 
Note: Total immigration in the 1990-2005 period: ΔF/(F+H)=11.1%, distributed as ΔLF/(LF+LH)= 24.4%, 
ΔMF/(MF+MH)= 8.2%,  ΔSF/(SF+SH)= 11.6%. The elasticities are relative to the percentage change in the group 
due to immigration.   51
Table 8 
Simulated Long-Run Impact of Immigration: 
Counterfactual scenarios 
 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) (V)  (VI) (VII) 
 
Simulated Long-Run Average Impact of Immigration 
 
Long-Run Elasticity 
γwage natives  0.345 0.267 0.290 0.348 0.218 0.215 0.422 
γrent natives  0.680 0.848 0.759 0.635 0.902 0.924 0.523 
γ employment natives  0.359 0.618 0.463 0.293 0.667 0.720 0.140 
Long-Run Percentage Effects of Immigration 
Average Wage of Natives  3.84 2.42 3.95 5.06 2.72 2.25 4.72 
Average Rent of Natives  7.56 7.70 10.32  9.25 11.23  9.65 5.84 
Total Employment of Natives  3.99 5.61 6.29 4.27 8.30 7.52 1.56 
 
Simulated Long-Run Impact of Immigration by Skill 
 
Long-Run Elasticities 
γwage natives Low Skills  0.255 0.312 0.276 0.239 0.319 0.331 0.206 
γwage natives Medium Skills  0.206 0.259 0.228 0.192 0.268 0.278 0.159 
γwage natives High Skills  0.210 0.265 0.234 0.195 0.278 0.287 0.160 
γrent price natives Low Skills  0.573 0.340 0.358 0.595 0.158 0.200 0.853 
γrent price natives Medium Skills  0.610 0.716 0.632 0.584 0.675 0.717 0.550 
γrent price natives High Skills  0.638 0.766 0.684 0.604 0.771 0.802 0.537 
Long-Run Percentage Effects of Immigration 
Real Rent  Low Skills  6.33 2.88 4.68 8.66 1.65 1.79 9.70 
Real Rent Medium Skills  6.74 6.29 8.41 8.49 8.06 7.17 6.30 
Real Rent High Skills  7.05 6.74 9.10 8.78 9.26 8.06 6.16 
 
Note: (I) Actual U.S. immigration in the 1990-2005 period: ΔLF/(LF+LH)= 24.4%, ΔMF/(MF+MH)= 
8.2%,  ΔSF/(SF+SH)= 11.6%; (II) Without the undocumented (estimates by Passel, 2006): 6.6%, 8.2%, 11.6%; 
(III) California scenario: 18%, 11%, 17%; (IV) Texas scenario: 34%, 11%, 14%; (V) New Jersey scenario: 3%, 
10%, 21%; (VI) New York scenario: 1%, 9%, 17%; (VII) New Mexico scenario: 38%, 8%, 7%. 
 